Background
The reasons for the shortfall in provision are manifold, but innovation is the most important-and of special concern in cardiology because the pace of progress has been spectacular. Some cardiologists still active in the discipline were practising when digitalis, quinidine, nitrates, mercurial diuretics, and hexamethonium were the only specific remedies available for heart disease. Surgical options comprised closure of a patent ductus, Blalock anastomoses, and relief of mitral stenosis by digital splitting of The shortfall in cardiological services within the United Kingdom is greater than many perceive. Provision remains grossly uneven and where little is provided expectation remains low. This is no justification for continuing inactivity. We believe that it is inappropriate that in 1988 45 of 210 health districts in England and Wales did not have a trained cardiologist4 or that over 2 million people identified in an earlier survey had no immediate access to temporary pacing for countering a life threatening emergency. 5 The argument that Western Europe as a whole has more than seven times as many cardiologists proportionally than the United Kingdom and that the United States has 10 times more may not be a strong one.4 But it may be relevant to ask whether financial constraints were, historically, the only reason for this disparity? Perhaps they were not. In the United Kingdom we have currently a system that is neither directly responsive to market forces nor subject to strict central control.
Priorities are determined at a local level by a process that is administrative and locally "political", often without a full appreciation of the weight of competing needs.
Even such provision as is available may not This process of allocation is often confused with rationing. Rationing accepts a given allocated volume of resource and attempts to achieve a defined objective: the maximum beneficial health effect within a given scale of provision. Within the NHS rationing has always been a clinically based activity. Decisions on priority for admission and treatment are made by clinicians according to clinically determined criteria. This responsibility is the other side of the coin of clinical freedom. The stringency of rationing depends on the adequacy of allocated resources and fairly modest increases in allocation, particularly if sustained, might remove many of clinicians' current problems.
How rational can we make allocation? The truth is that since the 1950s health has been relatively well treated compared with other major publicly funded sectors,1 and it is probably unreasonable to expect that public funding of the NHS will increase in real terms by more than 1-2% a year, despite a widely shared perception of need. Total expenditure on health could be increased by a greater reliance on the private sector and charitable and voluntary resources. There is also the drive within NHS management towards greater efficiency and productivity in the use of available resources.
The decisions taken by regional and district health authorities on the allocation of funding to cardiological and cardiac surgical services are influenced by three mechanisms.
POLITICO-VOCAL MECHANISM
The politico-vocal mechanism-"who shouts loudest gets most"-has a long and distinguished tradition. It encompassess the use of "political" pressure groups, including public sympathy and emotion. In a service where the objectives are set by political considerations and considerations ofpersonal value, there may be no alternative to being guided by the process described as "disjointed incrementalism" .
RATIONAL-DISTRIBUTIVE MECHANISM
This originates with the perception that neither the providers nor the consumers of health care are competent to assess national need. The conventional response is to require epidemiologists and health system managers to identify these total population needs and establish programmes of service activity designed to secure health improvements. Some planners and managers believe that the introduction of any new technology should be supported by evidence from randomised controlled trials, but they may not always understand the limitations of such trials. Trials offer the best guidance we have for the efficacy of treatment but .there is often room for a different interpretation and rejection of what may seem definitive conclusions. Moreover, trial results are never wholly relevant to an individual patient with his or her own unique set of pathological and functional problems.
Despite these uncertainties, planners and managers also increasingly expect additional the inefficiencies inherent in any large evaluative information, which can be equally bureaucracy. The authors of the white paper difficult to provide and interpret. They want to believe that this greater efficiency will be know not only that a procedure is effective but associated with a better quality of care and that also how effective and at what cost. Cost utility standards can be set and monitored within the analysis is one method designed to consider the contracts. A substantial investment will be cost of new technologies against their potential necessary in information systems to support global population benefit. Mortality benefit is the contractual interface between purchasers adjusted for the quality of life during the life and providers. Will the expected benefits be years gained by the application of the tech-achieved? The answers to this question lie in nology. This measuring tool is termed the the future, though the challenge is immediate.
QALY-Quality Adjusted Life Year. There are various difficulties associated with this approach and it has received substantial criti-The difficult way forward cism.
It is clear that cardiologists and cardiac surWhile the basic principle of cost-utility geons must be involved in decisions about both analysis cannot be challenged its implementa-allocation and rationing if they are to influence tion is more difficult than many believe. What is these processes for the benefit of patients. Yet cost and how is it measured? Should judgments this object poses an inevitable dilemma. Should be made based on cost to the hospital or to the doctors face the costs of their decisions? If they NHS? The two can be very different. Should do not, the result can be inefficiency and we be concerned with marginal costs or full favoured provision ofpatient care for the few to costs? Should costs be calculated per procedure the detriment of the many. If they do, then the or per case? Should the calculation be for this result could theoretically be a downward presadmission, this year, or forever? Even if the sure on the quality of service. guidelines are agreed, measurement is comWe have no easy solution. Most agree that plex, as wide disparities in data (for example the clinical views should be heard at the level of the cost of coronary artery bypass grafting) can political allocation, at the level of local adminisattest. How easy is it to estimate outcome? trative distribution of the allocation using the Many feel it is not easy, and that attempts to do most appropriate "rational" means, and within so may lead to misleading distortions. Alth-the unit itself, increasingly through an ough the QALY is likely to become established involvement in resource management. This as a permanent package within health econ-involvement in resource management may omics, it is at best a crude measure and may be reduce anomalies in the provision of health care based on questionable assumptions. but has little effect on the adequacy of allocaNevertheless, despite these limitations, the tion. technique can be useful in guiding decisions on Clinicians must accept that if treatment of allocation and in extending the framework of proven effectiveness is not available for all who "rationality" on which they are based. For may benefit, an element of rationing must be example the results of ISIS-2 show the clinical introduced if provision is to be better than effectiveness of treatment with streptokinase as random; but this poses considerable problems well as aspirin after infarction.8 It can be shown when dealing with individual patients. by cost-utility analysis9 that the costs per Physicians and surgeons are already familiar QALY of adding streptokinase into the treat-with triage as the technique invented by ment required are low compared with those military surgeons for selecting battlefield costs published for other procedures in routine casualties most likely to benefit from the use, including mammography, heart transplan-application of scarce resources. But when this tation, coronary artery bypass grafting, and all process has an economic basis it is less familiar types of treatment for end stage renal and less welcome. It creates a even greater failure.1' dilemma because it influences the doctorpatient relationship. The patient regards the MARKET ORIENTATION physician as a trusted adviser, and expects him A pure market orientation is inappropriate to be, where necessary, his advocate. within health care provision because those How can physicians combine their clinical most in need are often least able to pay. For this roles with their responsibility for the use of reason the proposals within the NHS white resources? No one but the physician can make paper aim to continue to base funding largely rationing decisions based on clinical criteria. upon taxation, with receipt of service remain-Yet their actions must not damage their ing substantially free at the point of delivery. relationship with an individual patient. Again Publicly funded authorities will determine the we have no ready answer, but only a part health care needs of the population and will solution. Physicians will come to see that purchase services to meet those needs from a involvement in the processes of medical audit range of service providers, within both the and resource management can lead increasingly public and private sectors. Increasingly these to informed decisions based upon knowledge of "purchasing" authorities will not manage outcomes that are translated into agreed services directly. "Providers" will deliver protocols for service delivery. In this way service against contracts established with the doctors should not need to introduce budgetary "purchasing" authorities; the competitive for-considerations into clinical decisions about ces created within this marketplace are expec-individual patients. They will recognise the ted to create increased efficiency and eliminate position of their patient in relation to a predetermined guideline or protocol for availability of treatment. It seems acceptable that they should act accordingly, but ideally with the full understanding of the patient. In this way physicians can-at least to a degreebe accountable to Those who exercise this freedom will welcome a greater involvement in audit and peer review and in resource management, which-applied with wisdom-must be adopted to provide information within the peer group on criteria for sensible clinical rationing.
The gap between what is technologically possible and what can be funded publicly will grow. Allocation can never be totally rational, and the NHS will continue to operate within a political context. Many expectations will not be met. Clinical rationing will require more attention to audit and to the creation of agreed treatment protocols, based on evaluation. If cardiologists and cardiac surgeons do not accept their rationing role in clinical management others will. This paper is based on presentations at a Cardiovascular Workshop in June 1989 arranged by Mr Dimitri de Grunwald for Bayer Pharmaceuticals whose help and encouragement is gratefully acknowledged.
